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At ﬁrst glance, the process that led to Japan’s annexation of Korea in 1910 was rela-
tively simple.  In 1876, Japan imposed an “unequal treaty” upon Korea, one that re-
sembled the agreements Japan had been forced to sign with Western powers some 
twenty years earlier.  This “opening” of Korea marked the beginning of a dual process: 
on one hand was the growing involvement of Japan with the neighboring peninsula, 
and on the other hand was the strengthening of other countries’ power, which would 
be used by the Koreans to counterbalance Japan.  The ﬁrst of these countries was Chi-
na, which Japan defeated in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895.  The second was 
Russia, which Japan defeated ten years later in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. 
It was in the aftermath of that second conﬂict that Korea became a Japanese protector-
ate in 1905, before being annexed in 1910.  If we focus only on major events, we can 
see a clear chronological framework.
1876 :  Opening of Korea and the beginnings of modern Japanese involve-
ment in the peninsula
1894–1895 : Sino-Japanese War; China’s inﬂuence in Korea is ended
1904–1905 : Russo-Japanese War; Russia’s inﬂuence is ended
1905 : Korea becomes a protectorate of Japan
1910 : Korea is annexed to Japan, and becomes de facto a colony of Japan
However, it is doubtful that the path to annexation was quite so straightforward.  In 
1876, very few Japanese were able to imagine that one day their country would absorb 
Korea.  However, the Korean collective memory of those years depict an inevitable 
progression of an unstoppable Japanese will, leading straight from the 1868 Meiji Res-
toration to the 1910 annexation.
The purpose of this paper is to go beyond this debate by moving away from the 
chronological track, and instead to trace the intellectual origins of the annexation. 
Some of the deeper causes of the annexation indeed belong to the ﬁeld of representa-
tions or worldviews.  On the eve of the centennial of the annexation, it is essential to 
map these ideas and analyze them in a broad perspective.
Three main views of Korea emerge from the huge quantity of writings on the Kore-
an question (Cho¯sen mondai ) published during the Meiji period (1868–1912).  The ﬁrst, 
the strategic view, saw Korea in a national security context.  The second, the civiliza-
tional view, opposed a backward Korea to a civilized Japan.  The third, the racial 
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view, considered the Koreans as the racial brethren of the Japanese.  These views were 
linked to each other and fed one another, though they were not translated into consis-
tent lines of action.  Nevertheless, examining these views sheds light on some of the 
primary factors that led to annexation.
The Strategic View: Korea as Japan’s First Line of Defense
The idea that the Korean peninsula was vital to Japan’s security appeared at the end 
of the eighteenth century.  At the beginning of the Meiji period, and particularly after 
the opening of Korea in 1876, Korea was often deﬁned as Japan’s ﬁrst line of defense 
against Russia.  This view became standard by the end of the decade.  Many press ar-
ticles stated then that the Japanese–Korean relationship was based on national de-
fense.1)
For example, in August 1880, the Cho¯ya shinbun drew a comparison between the 
opening of Japan by the West and the opening of Korea by Japan.  These two events 
might be similar in appearance, wrote the newspaper, but actually they were com-
pletely different.  Japan drew interest from Western countries for economic reasons, 
whereas Japan’s interest in Korea was strategic.  By securing Korea’s independence, 
Japan was actually building its own Great Wall against Russia and China.
Korea is at a strategic location in the Orient.  If you consider its close proximity 
to Japan, it is a country with which we are closely linked.  If China makes Korea 
part of its territory and seeks to extend its power, Japan will be at great disadvan-
tage.  If Korea is absorbed by Russia, we might loose our control on Tsushima 
and the Oki Islands, and Kyu¯shu¯ and Chu¯goku will ﬁnd themselves facing a 
powerful Russia.  Thus, our national interest requires that we lend support to the 
independence of Korea, so that Korea is neither absorbed by Russia, neither sub-
ject to the control of China.  …  Korea is currently in a situation similar to what 
Japan experienced in the past.  Nevertheless, Japan’s interests in Korea differ 
from those other countries had in the past in respect to Japan.  While their objec-
tive in maintaining relationships with us were purely commercial, our goal in es-
tablishing relations with Korea is different.  By enhancing the independence of 
Korea, we are building our Great Wall.2)
It should be stressed that we are not examining here the real nature of the Russian 
or Chinese threat to Japan or the real importance of Korea to Japan’s security.  What 
interests us is the perception Japan had of these threats and the importance of Korea 
for its own security.  By the end of the 1870s, the view of Korea as Japan’s ﬁrst line of 
defense was becoming axiomatic.  No one in Japan doubted its veracity.
Even people opposed to Japan’s growing involvement in Korea did not doubt the 
importance of Korea to Japanese security.  What they contested were the means, not 
the goals.  The independence and stability of Korea were of such importance to Japan, 
they said, that Japan had to be most careful in dealing with Korea.  Japan had to do 
everything to avoid a Russian attack on its soil.  Some even went as far as to say that 
even if Russia attacked Korea, Japan should not intervene, but stay neutral.3)
In the long term, such an attitude was unsustainable.  If Korea was so important to 
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Japan’s security, how could Japan stay neutral if Korea came under attack?  This might 
explain why opponents to Japanese involvement in the peninsula in the 1870s lost 
their inﬂuence and even strengthened the position of their adversaries.
The events of 1882 and 18844) reinforced and extended this strategic view.  Govern-
ment circles began to fear that Korea would, one day, fall under Chinese or Russian 
control and turn into a sword, which would directly threaten Japan’s heart.  To avoid 
such a situation, Japan endeavored to ﬁnd a diplomatic solution to the “Korean prob-
lem” and to turn Korea into a neutral border country, one much like Belgium or Swit-
zerland in Europe.
This approach to the Korea question reached its peak in 1890 with the Memoran-
dum on Foreign Policy (Gaiko¯ seiryakuron ) of Prime Minister Yamagata Aritomo.  Ad-
dressing the new Diet, Yamagata deﬁned two lines of defense that each country must 
secure: the line of sovereignty (shukensen ), made of that country’s sovereign territory, 
and the line of interest (riekisen ), that is, the area from which foreign troops were able 
to threaten the above line of sovereignty.  Having proposed these theoretical premises, 
Yamagata then stated that in the case of Japan, Korea constituted the center of its line 
of interest.  He therefore proposed placing the neighboring country under internation-
al protection so that it would remain neutral.  Yamagata was thus giving ofﬁcial and 
theoretical legitimacy to ideas that had been circulating for quite some time.
There are two ways to secure a country’s independence and security.  The ﬁrst is 
to protect its  line of sovereignty so nobody infringes upon it.  The second is to 
defend its line of interest, so as not to lose its strategic space.  The line of sover-
eignty is the territory.  The line of interest is the area from where the armed forc-
es of neighboring countries are able to challenge the safety of the line of sover-
eignty.  …  As for Japan, Korea is at the center of its line of interest.  … 
Therefore, the neutrality of Korea is crucial to Japan’s security.5)
Korea’s neutrality should be jointly guaranteed by Japan and China, suggested 
Yamagata, adding that such a Sino–Japanese agreement would itself be placed under 
international sponsorship.  Japan and China would thus become the “common protec-
tors” (kyo¯do¯ hogoshu ) of Korea, and thereby establish a “balance of power” (kinsei ). 
Such a neutral and independent Korea would be similar to Switzerland, Belgium, Ser-
bia, or Luxembourg, and would be the best guarantor of peace and stability.
This address by Yamagata was the culminating point of the strategic view of Korea. 
Japan’s prime minister, the man who created the modern Japanese armed forces, was 
ofﬁcially declaring that Korea was Japan’s ﬁrst line of defense, and that any threat to 
its independence would be a direct threat against Japan’s security.  Moreover, Korea 
was viewed as a dependent country, unable to autonomously guarantee its own neu-
trality.
These ideas would later trigger the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895.  Japan had 
tried to take matters into its own hands in Korea, and the end of this story is well 
known.  The Japanese victory over China did not solve anything.  After the Chinese 
came the Russians, and their advance into Manchuria and Korea increased Japanese 
concern in the region.  In 1904, Japan and Russia were at war.  At the end of the war, 
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in 1905, Korea became a Japanese protectorate.  The strategic view of Korea was the 
cause of two major wars, and of hundreds of thousands of deaths, and eventually led 
to the loss of Korean independence.
The Civilizational View: A Barbarian Korea vs. a Civilized Japan
The annexation of Korea in 1910 did not stem only from strategic considerations. 
A civilizational view of the neighboring country also developed in Meiji Japan.  This 
conception opposed a barbaric and backward Korea to a civilized and advanced Ja-
pan.  Korea was still barbaric (yaban ), while Japan was already civilized (kaika).
This view can be traced back to before the opening of Korea in 1876.  The neigh-
boring country’s barbarity was then virtual and axiomatic, and not based on any con-
crete knowledge of present-day Korea.  Except for a handful of traders from Tsushima 
and the small delegation conﬁned inside the Japan House (Waegwan, Wakan ) in Pusan, 
there was no contact between Japanese and Koreans at that time.  The Tsushima trade 
had been in constant decline since the last quarter of the eighteenth century, no Kore-
an ofﬁcial delegation had visited to Japan since 1811, and that last delegation did not 
go farther than Tsushima.
Despite this absence of concrete knowledge, Korea was almost unanimously de-
scribed as a barbaric country.  Like the strategic view of Korea, the civilizational view 
was used for opposing purposes.  It could serve as a justiﬁcation to intervene in Korea, 
and to justify calls not to intervene in Korea.  In the ﬁrst case, it was argued that a vig-
orous policy toward the neighboring country would help make Japan equal to the 
Western Powers.  Korea was an opportunity Japan could not overlook.6)  In the second 
case, the argument was that the Japanese should not sacriﬁce themselves for a barbaric 
people.  Korea could not be a partner of Japan; the Imperial ﬂag should not be raised 
in front of human beings that resemble animals.  Pursuing such a policy would be a 
national humiliation.  Japan had also not yet reached the highest degree of civilization, 
so consorting with barbarians such as the Koreans could cause Western countries not 
to make the distinction between Japanese and Koreans.7)
With the opening of Korea in 1876, Korean barbarity acquired a concrete dimen-
sion.  Japanese journalists went to Korea and reported from there.  On March 7, 1876, 
the To¯kyo¯ akebono shinbun published one of the ﬁrst modern Japanese reports on Korea. 
It read as follows:
Here is a concise relation of the conditions reigning in Korea.
The Koreans are extremely afraid of the Japanese; when we ﬁrst cast anchor 
in Kanghwa, we saw the natives carrying our luggage running away.  Finally, af-
ter they understood our feelings, they calmed down, but although some eventu-
ally returned, we did not see any beautiful young ladies; they were all hiding in 
the houses and did not come out.
In Kanghwa, one can ﬁnd only bare mountains, and trees are rare.  Most of 
the houses are small; they do not exceed four or ﬁve shaku in height [1 shaku is 
about 30 centimeters] and are made of much earth and some wood.  Under the 
ﬂoor is a solidiﬁed trench, where you burn ﬁre, and the rising heat protects from 
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the heavy cold.  The common people do not use any blankets to sleep, but wrap 
themselves in a thing similar to what can be found in distant Ryu¯kyu¯.  It is remi-
niscent of the inhabitants of the deep mountains of Japan, who sleep together 
near the ﬁre and do not use any bedding.  The city is unhealthy, and numerous 
people are affected by these conditions.
Our temporary delegation building is a spacious place, a lordly house among 
the best in Kanghwa, nevertheless it is made only of four pillars.  As there are no 
seats on the ground, one has to spread blankets to sit and lie down, and after sev-
eral days, one feels strong pains in the back and the knees.  Furthermore, there is 
neither rag nor broom; dirt and dust cover the ground, and one absorbs these to-
gether with food and dust.  The Koreans do not, out of laziness, clean their hous-
es or bathe themselves.  These people do not take more than three or four baths 
a year.
Beginning with the ambassador, we do not consume any Korean products. 
Rice, miso, vegetables, ﬁsh; one uses only things brought from afar.
The Koreans, having surmounted their fear of the Japanese, gather every day 
in front of our temporary building, and when we go to town, the roads are ﬁlled 
with children following us and with people coming to see us.  They are amazed 
by the strangeness of our ﬂat hats, our narrow sleeves, and our general look, as 
was the case with the Americans when for the ﬁrst time they cast the anchor in 
Uraga during the Kaei era [1848–1854].
The clothes of the Koreans look like those of the inhabitants of Nanjing, which 
must be the ancient Chinese fashion.  Their headgear is often made from a kind 
of straw, and the warriors carry a sword on their back.
In spite of the despicable aspect of the character of all classes, there are many 
schools.  However, they preserve everywhere Chinese studies, and no one has 
any view of current Western science.  It is therefore unavoidable that in all ﬁelds 
stagnation and rigidity prevail.  Production consists of ginseng, and they also 
grow in small quantity a sort of tobacco.  I do not think we will beneﬁt from the 
opening of their ports.
The Americans and the French attacked Korea some years ago, but in view of 
the conditions, withdrew their troops.  The barbarity of the people and the lack 
of wealth of the land made them understand that there was neither value in de-
feating this country nor proﬁt in subduing it.8)
Korea was a primitive and backward country, devoid of resources.  Japan could not 
expect any proﬁt from exchanges with the peninsula.  Such was, roughly speaking, the 
image conveyed by this report.
The backward aspect of Korea was exposed from several angles.  The conditions of 
life were analogous to those in Okinawa or the most remote parts of Japan.  The Kore-
ans were scared by foreign things and amazed by new and modern objects.  Their ed-
ucational system, although quite developed, was anchored in the Chinese tradition, 
and ignored the science of its time.  Agriculture, reduced to ginseng and a type of to-
bacco, was also very primitive.  As the article concluded, there is “neither value in de-
feating this country nor proﬁt in subduing it,” which the Americans and the French 
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had already understood.
This description of Korea’s backwardness, which was common to almost all the Jap-
anese reports of the time, transposed the image of a barbaric Korea from the axiomat-
ic sphere to that of reality.  Between the Meiji Restoration and the Kanghwa Treaty, 
Korea was generally perceived as a small “barbaric” country, as opposed to “civilized” 
Japan, or more precisely, Japan on the path to civilization.  This Korean barbarism did 
not originate in any real description of the conditions in the peninsula.  In the article 
quoted above, Korea was described as a primitive and unhealthy country and the Ko-
reans as unintelligent, oppressed, and fearful people.  They knew nothing of civiliza-
tion, and China was their supreme reference.  The old formulas thus acquired a con-
crete substance, a real dimension, and a new force of persuasion.
The civilizational view of Korea will be translated into reality in two different ways, 
which are opposite but basically linked:
1. A will to civilize Korea—in order to lead Korea on the path that Japan has al-
ready followed successfully;
2. A will to cut the link with Korea, to abandon the neighboring country to its fate 
and to treat it in a Western fashion.
The best illustration of these two incarnations can be found in the same man, Fuku-
zawa Yukichi.  Fukuzawa’s greatness may come less from the originality of his 
thoughts than from his ability to express, better than anyone else, the deep currents 
that were at work inside Japanese society.  Through Fukuzawa, we can therefore wit-
ness the evolution of the civilizational view of Korea.
The contacts between Fukuzawa and the Korean reformers at the beginning of the 
1880s are well known.  Fukuzawa took in a number of Korean students at the Keio¯ In-
stitute, and became especially enthusiastic about one of the reform leaders, Kim 
Okkyun.  Fukuzawa and the Korean reformers believed that Korea should become a 
fully independent country, and that reforms should be enacted.
Fukuzawa explained his stand using an allegory about two bordering houses, one 
made of stone and the other of wood.  If the owner of the stone house wishes to fully 
protect his dwelling from a possible ﬁre, he has to persuade his neighbor to build his 
house of stone, too.  Otherwise, a ﬁre that would erupt in the wooden house might 
spread and also endanger the adjacent stone house.9)
Fukuzawa’s strategic view was that a stable and modern Korea would be a vital 
component in Japan’s security.  However, Fukuzawa was not content with this prag-
matic argument.  In a letter from the same period, he disclosed a less well-known side 
of his approach to Korea, a sentimental and nostalgic view:
At the beginning of this month, a number of Koreans came to Japan in order 
to observe the conditions in our country, and two young men among them were 
admitted to our institute.  I had them settled in my place, and I will apply myself 
to guide them gently.  Truly, when I remember how I was more than twenty 
years ago, I cannot stop feeling sympathy and compassion for them.  …  When 
Koreans, elevated or humble, come and visit me, and when I am listening to 
them, it is the Japan of thirty years ago that reappears in front of my eyes.10)
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Fukuzawa was altogether sentimental and pragmatic, idealistic and realistic.  There 
was no contradiction.  These young, enthusiastic Koreans reminded him of his youth, 
and he wished to guide them “gently” (yasashiku ), a rare word in his vocabulary.11)
Why?  Because today’s Korea was the Japan of the past, the Japan of thirty years ago, 
the Japan on the eve of the opening of the country, the Japan before the Meiji Resto-
ration and before the great reforms.  On one hand, Fukuzawa wanted to stabilize Ko-
rea for Japan’s security.  On the other hand, he viewed the neighboring country as a 
kind of Japan from the past.  Korea was altogether a shadow of the past and an object 
ripe for civilization.
The practical consequence of this dual approach would be the moral and material 
support Fukuzawa would grant and try to obtain for Korean reformers.  When these 
same reformers failed to fulﬁll his expectations after the ﬁasco of the 1884 coup d’état, 
Fukuzawa would reverse his stance.  His famous call “to escape from Asia” (datsuaron ) 
did not mention Korea,12) but it originated in his disappointment at the neighboring 
country’s progress.  By accepting the premises of Western civilization, Japan, Fukuza-
wa argued, had acquired the right to lead the East on the path of civilization.  Howev-
er, if its neighbors, especially Korea, refused to join Japan on this path, Japan had the 
right to step away from them, to abandon them to their fate, and to consider them as 
Westerners would.  If Korea wished to remain the Japan of the past, it was free to do 
so, but in that case, Japan of the present would not attempt any further to contribute to 
the country’s progress.
In the following years, the civilizational view would continue to prosper, oscillating 
between the two alternatives of active involvement and disengagement, until the Sino-
Japanese War tipped the scales deﬁnitively toward greater Japanese involvement in 
Korea.  From then on, the civilizational view would be used to justify Japan’s penetra-
tion of Korea.  At the beginning of the twentieth century, the economist Fukuda 
Tokuzo¯ transformed this view into a scientiﬁc explanation he called the “theory of 
stagnation” (teitairon ).13)  This concept emerged from Fukuda’s German Ph.D. disserta-
tion in which he argued that the existence of a feudal stage in the histories of Japan 
and the West explained their similar economic evolution.  Modern economies could 
emerge in Japan and the West because both had followed similar historical patterns of 
development.
Fukuda tried to prove this point by studying the economic development of Korea. 
He traveled in the peninsula in 1903, and upon his return to Japan published a series 
of articles entitled “Economic Organization and Economic Units in Korea” (Kankoku 
no keizai soshiki to keizai tani ),14) in which he explained Korea’s backwardness as due to 
the absence of a feudal stage in the country’s historical development.  Therefore, he 
argued, contemporary Korea corresponded to Japan during the Fujiwara period (from 
the end of the ninth century to end of the twelfth century).  Korea was still “stagnat-
ing” at a pre-feudal stage and the country was unable to enter a process of autono-
mous development.  Fukuda concluded that Japan’s duty was to assist in making Ko-
rea similar to Japan.
This theory would play an important role after the annexation, but Fukuda not only 
represented the seed of the future, he was also the outcome of the past.  He justiﬁed 
with theory ideas that had been circulating in Japan since the 1870s.  Historically 
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speaking, Japan was indeed different than its neighbors, but this meant that Japan bore 
a responsibility to them.  Since Korea is similar to Japan of the past, to pre-feudal Ja-
pan, Japan of the present must help the peninsula bridge the historical gap.  Fukuda 
was echoing the widespread views of Japan itself.  By despising their “primitive” Kore-
an neighbor, the Japanese were expressing the rejection of their own past and the 
conﬁdence that their own accomplishments might too become, tomorrow, Korea’s 
achievements.
The Racial View: A Common Origin of Japanese and Koreans
There was one more view of Korea at the core of the annexation, the racial view. 
While the civilizational view stressed differences between the Japanese and Koreans, 
the racial view highlighted similarities between the two peoples.  This view was thus 
inclusive, and would naturally be used to justify annexation.15)
Western racial theories forwarded in the nineteenth century were widely accepted 
in Japan.  Mankind was divided into various races, among them the “yellow” and 
“white” races.  In 1869, Fukuzawa published Pocket Atlas (Sho¯chu¯ bankoku ichiran), in 
which he described the earth and its inhabitants for the new modern Japanese.  Fuku-
zawa simpliﬁed a portion of the Western racial theories and associated each continent 
with only one race.  White people were in Europe, yellow people in Asia, red people 
in America, black people in Africa, and brown people on the Paciﬁc Islands.  He also 
clearly deﬁned the attributes of each race: “The white race is the ﬁnest.  It is character-
ized by its intelligence, and is able to achieve the highest degree of civilization.  The 
yellow race is industrious and able to endure hardships, but its talents are limited, and 
it progresses very slowly.”  The red, black, and brown races were respectively deﬁned 
as severe and bitter, indolent, and violent and vengeful.16)
Fukuzawa was not so much interested in the races as in the successive four stages of 
civilizational development: chaotic (konton ), barbaric (yaban ), primitive (mikai ), and 
developed (kaika).17)  The white race was not only located at the top of the racial scale, 
but also at the apex of the civilizational hierarchy.18)  This white superiority (and there-
fore yellow inferiority) dogma was commonplace in the early Meiji period, and some-
times even lead to proposals for enforcing a policy of miscegenation.  However, those 
suggestions generally provoked ﬁerce reactions, and these racial ideas eventually de-
veloped in a different direction.  After all, no human group will ever agree to perma-
nently consider itself as inferior.  This can only be a temporary expression of a pro-
found identity crisis.  Identity will eventually be assumed and placed at the service of 
new ideals.
This is what happened in Japan.  Together with the civilizational view of Asia ap-
peared a racial view with opposite consequences.  If the former resulted in a will to 
depart from Asia and to assimilate into Western culture, the later brought about a 
quest for a national identity connected to Asia, a feeling of Asian solidarity directed 
against a common white enemy.
Tarui To¯kichi was the ﬁrst to fully apply these ideas to the Japanese–Korean situa-
tion when he envisioned in 1890 the creation of a Japanese-Korean federation.  “The 
white people want to exterminate us.  …  The only way to defeat them is to create a 
united force, made of members of the same race.”19)  The Japanese and Koreans are 
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“racial brethren” (do¯shu no kyo¯dai ) lost on a boat adrift.  They should unite into a feder-
al state that would enable them to prevent Asia from falling further under what he 
called the sway of Western slavery.20)
This quest for Japanese–Korean solidarity was not only the result of a racial view of 
the world, but also of a civilizational vision of human evolution.  Japan, being more 
civilized than the peninsula neighbor, was responsible for guiding Korea along the 
path it had already successfully followed.  The federation envisioned would thus serve 
as a model for the region and the entire Asian continent.
Japanese historians and linguists theorized this proximity of Japanese and Koreans. 
Since the beginning of the 1890s, some prominent scholars endeavored to demon-
strate the common origin of the Korean and Japanese people and their languages. 
The historians Hoshino Hisashi and Kume Kunitake were particularly active and 
proliﬁc.21)  They were positivist historians, and were proud of their independence of 
mind.  Together with Shigeno Yasutsugu, they are considered to have been the found-
ers of modern Japanese historical science.  In 1892, Kume was ﬁred from Tokyo Impe-
rial University after publishing a study that considered Shinto¯ within the context of 
other East Asian popular beliefs.  The assertion of common Japanese–Korean roots 
was also the result of this quest for origins.  This is well illustrated in a three-part arti-
cle on the formation of the Japanese state that he published in 1889 and 1890 in the 
ﬁrst issue of the history journal Shigakkai Zasshi .22)
In that article Kume claimed that the ancient Japanese were an indigenous race that 
had spread across the region, including the Korean peninsula.  Ancient Japan was 
much larger than present Japan and extended to the continent.  Kume’s narrative was 
based on racial and cultural proximity to the mainland.  Japan and Korea were associ-
ated since time immemorial, and Japan repeatedly rescued Korea in the distant past.
Hoshino reached even bolder conclusions.  In an article published in 1890, he ex-
amined the source of the imperial lineage and concluded that the imperial household 
originated from immigrants from the Korean state of Silla.  In ancient times, rulers 
who belonged to the same genealogy governed the Korean peninsula and the Japa-
nese archipelago.  “Japan and Korea was home to the same race and shared the same 
language.”  The two countries formed a single region and there was no boundary be-
tween them.
This unity ended later.  The rivalry between the two components of the country in-
creased and escalated into violence.  The Korean campaigns of the Empress Jingu¯ 
were part of the international upheavals of the time—the three Korean kingdoms, the 
reversal of the alliance between China and Japan, and the ﬁnal separation of Japan 
from the mainland.  According to Hoshino, documents attesting the common Japa-
nese–Korean origin existed but were destroyed by Emperor Kanmu in the eighth cen-
tury.  Hoshino was taking a great risk.  He could have been accused of dishonoring 
the imperial house.  This might explain the long and somewhat extravagant title of his 
article, “I Express My Opinion on Our Race and Language and I Inquire into the 
Hearts of Our Patriots.”23)  Hoshino meant to show that the archipelago and the pen-
insula once formed a single entity, with a common language and race, governed by 
the ancestors of the Japanese imperial dynasty.  What would be more natural than to 
return to this historical situation and restore the authority of the Japanese emperor 
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upon Korea?  Korea was a part of Japan which was lost in antiquity and which should 
now return home.24)
These patriotic arguments could not diminish the ambivalence of Hoshino’s posi-
tion, which implied a breach of the sacred origins of the imperial house.  Hoshino was 
strongly criticized, and in 1892, he resigned from his academic position.  Nevertheless, 
despite the criticisms and scandals, the belief in a Japanese–Korean common origin 
spread in the 1890s.  From now on, historians and anthropologists ardently discussed 
these racial issues.  As a result, the idea that Koreans and Japanese were somehow 
connected would penetrate school textbooks and popular publications, and become 
deeply ingrained among Japanese.
The logical implication of this Japanese–Korean link was that the separation of the 
two groups was contrary to nature.  These ideas would constitute the ideological basis 
of annexation, which would be presented as the restoration of an original racial unity, 
the return of a collateral branch (bunke ) to the main branch (honke ).25)
Language scholars reinforced the common origin hypothesis.  The ﬁrst modern 
scholar to see a relationship between the Japanese and Korean languages was the Brit-
ish diplomat W. G. Aston in 1879.  A decade later, when Kume and Hoshino were 
publishing the articles above, the idea was taken over by Japanese scholars, the most 
prominent being Kanazawa Sho¯zaburo¯.  Kanazawa was a brilliant young linguist.  He 
had been fascinated by the commonalities between the Japanese and Korean languag-
es since his studies at To¯kyo¯ Imperial University in the 1890s.  He traveled repeatedly 
to Korea, publishing his ﬁndings in the form of articles.  His book The Common Origin 
of the Japanese and Korean Languages (Nikkan ryo¯kokugo do¯keiron ) was published in 1910 
and widely used to justify annexation.  The title of his 1929 book, The Common Origin 
of Japanese and Koreans (Nissen do¯soron ), coined the expression that still describes the 
web of ideas on common Japanese-Korean origins.
This broad survey of the main views of Korea in Meiji Japan shows how all of these 
ideas progressively converged toward a similar conclusion—Japan must rule Korea. 
Japan must rule Korea to protect its own security, to fulﬁll its duty to its neighbor as a 
civilizer, and to bring home the little brother who strayed.  These views were, perhaps 
mainly, a reﬂection of the Japanese preoccupation with security, politics, and identity. 
The discourse on Korea in Meiji Japan was very often a discourse about Japan itself. 
Korea acted as a foil, an “other,” and helped elaborate the different images of an ideal, 
modern, and civilized Japan.
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